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E-Health Sensitive Data Dissemination
Exploiting Trust and Mobility of Users
Agnaldo de Souza Batista, Michele Nogueira, Aldri Santos
Abstract—E-health services handle a massive amount of sensitive data, requiring reliability and privacy. The advent of new
technologies drives e-health services into their continuous provision outside traditional care institutions. This creates uncertain and
unreliable conditions, resulting in the challenge of controlling sensitive user data dissemination. Then, there is a gap in sensitive data
dissemination under situations requiring fast response (e.g., cardiac arrest). This obligates networks to provide reliable sensitive data
dissemination under user mobility, dynamic network topology, and occasional interactions between the devices. In this article, we
propose STEALTH, a system that employs social trust and communities of interest to address these challenges. STEALTH follows two
steps: clustering and dissemination. In the first, STEALTH groups devices based on the interests of their users, forming communities of
interest. A healthcare urgency launches the second, in which STEALTH disseminates user sensitive data to devices belonging to
specific communities, subjected to the level of trust between devices. Simulation results demonstrate that STEALTH ensures data
dissemination to people who can contribute toward an efficient service. STEALTH has achieved up to 97.14% of reliability in accessing
sensitive data with a maximum latency of 170 ms, and up to 100% of availability during emergencies.
Index Terms—E-health,sensitive data dissemination, dynamic networks, critical events, dissemination control, safety.
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1 INTRODUCTION
THE Internet allows us to access an increasing numberof online services, supporting the population in dif-
ferent application domains like healthcare, transportation,
surveillance, among other. Forecasts estimate that the size
of digital health market can exceed USD 504.4 billion by
2025 [1]. In this context, e-health services, like online patient
monitoring, continuous glucose monitoring, automated in-
sulin delivery, and electronic health records, have leveraged
citizens’ quality of life streamlining care and contributing
to reduce operational costs. These services collect and dis-
seminate data often through opportunistic contacts between
geographically near devices, when interactions enable the
communication [2]. Data dissemination relies on sharing,
being a demanding task, intensified by a high data dis-
semination frequency, location, and content [3], [4]. Many
services require dynamically established local or global net-
works to support their operation under mobility.
Mobile devices collect various types of data [5], allow-
ing improvements in different domains. The interaction
between people and smartphones has intensified, allowing
the formation of temporary local networks, where data are
exchanged for different purposes and usually for a period.
In general, these dynamics rely on structured wireless net-
works (e.g., structured WiFi-based or cellular networks),
which offer extensive coverage inside buildings and cities.
These networks inhibit direct communication between de-
vices, which often impacts the response time on critical
events (e.g., traffic accident, health emergency, and environ-
mental disaster). E-health services lean on well-structured
networks in hospitals and clinics to disseminate sensitive
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data. However, people also might need these services any-
where and anytime, including exterior environments.
People can be suddenly stricken by a health issue. In
2011, more than 326 200 people experienced medical emer-
gencies observed out-of-hospital in the United States [6].
Therefore, building and maintaining urban outside environ-
ments (e.g., streets and avenues) are a challenge, mainly to
provide e-health services, given the need for a reliable net-
work infrastructure. The nature of sensitive health data ad-
dressed by e-health services (e.g., vital data, blood pressure
information, glucose measurements, exam results, and med-
ical prescriptions) requires reliability in data dissemination
and protection from unauthorized access. Furthermore, due
to their emergency nature, medical alerts must be promptly
transmitted [7] with a maximum latency of 125ms [8], once
the consequences in the face of losses and delays can be
severe to users health [9].
Currently, the existing mechanisms are inadequate to
deal with healthcare urgency in urban environments, such
as a cardiac arrest, change in blood pressure, or change in
glucose level, because they require prompt treatment. Safety
services deliver data to the right people and prevent leaks.
Several works in the literature address data availability in
unstructured networks in the contexts of Internet of Things
(IoT) [10], [11], MANETs [12], and P2P [13]. But, they take
as basis previous interactions for the decision-making in
handling data. Few studies turn to situations where pre-
vious interactions are unknown (zero-knowledge [14]), in
which there is only information from current interactions.
Therefore, these solutions are not suitable for dynamic and
sparse urban environments, as they assume the existence of
a network infrastructure before data dissemination.
The ubiquitous presence of smartphones in people’s
lives supports direct communication between them by
means of technologies as bluetooth and WiFi [15]. Smart-
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phones serve as gateways once they have multiple network
interfaces, interconnecting users medical devices to the In-
ternet [16] to disseminate their health data. However, data
dissemination must occur under control in networks to de-
liver data to the correct entities at the appropriate time [17].
In this context, the social aspects of the devices owners and
from their relationships enable grouping network devices
into communities [11]. Furthermore, some works employ
trust as a criterion to control data dissemination [10]. Al-
though suitable for unstructured networks, these works use
reputation and recommendation models to evaluate trust,
which in general are techniques dependent on the past
interactions between devices.
This article presents the STEALTH (Social Trust-Based
HEALTH Information Dissemination Control) system to
disseminate personal sensitive health data in a controlled
manner to achieve a minimum level of data confidentiality
in dynamic wireless local area networks. It forms commu-
nities by grouping devices with common interests to create
relationships of trust with each other. As long as the devices
belong to a community and they are in the same wireless
coverage range, they maintain connectivity with each other
and their interactions occur between devices inside the
community [11]. STEALTH considers the social aspects of
devices owners and their relationships to measure trust of
the neighbors. Under urgent situations, the system dissemi-
nates sensitive data controlling the process by choosing the
appropriate device and user to receive them.
We evaluate STEALTH in the NS-3 simulator [18] and
we analyze its dependability to disseminate sensitive health
data through evaluation metrics. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first work aimed at disseminating health
data in dynamic urban environments, outside conventional
environments (e.g., hospital or clinics). The results show that
STEALTH reaches 97.14% in data dissemination reliability
and a maximum latency of 170 ms, while data availability
achieves 100% under urgencies.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the re-
lated works. Section 3 introduces trust models in networks.
Section 4 details the proposed system. Section 5 describes
the evaluation methodology and results. Finally, Section 6
concludes the article and presents future directions.
2 RELATED WORK
Effective and fast data dissemination is a challenge [19]. It
comes from issues like dissemination frequency, dissemina-
tion location, and the nature of the content to be dissem-
inated [3], [4]. Data dissemination also suffers from link
losses, eavesdropping, and devices mobility [20]. Consid-
ering these issues, one may define an appropriate strategy
for data dissemination at the right time and to the right
person [17]. Hence, there are different strategies in the litera-
ture to address these issues. The applied strategies comprise
sending data in either an occasional or periodic fashion.
Also, they send data from a source to a specific destination,
or from a source to multiple destinations simultaneously.
Data dissemination raises security and safety concerns,
particularly, if the information is sensitive and vulnera-
ble to privacy attacks. The commonly applied techniques
to data dissemination are broadcasting data [21], multi-
hopping transmission [22], and data replication [23]. In
dynamic scenarios (when there is a intense device mobility) ,
broadcasting data is an adequate solution [17]. The authors
in [21] proposed a protocol to disseminate data in mobile
IoT networks. This protocol combines the neighborhood
knowledge from nodes and adapts the connectivity factor
to calculate the probability to determine whether a packet
should be broadcast to other nodes or discarded, to prevent
redundant packet broadcast. Although it is an effective strat-
egy to data dissemination, it can cause channel collisions
and compromise sensitive data privacy, as nodes do not
control whom effective is receiving the disseminated data.
Multi-hopping data transmission can be applied in dy-
namic and infrastructure-free environments. In [22], the
authors presented a general-purpose IoT platform based on
a combination of Low-power Wireless Personal Area Net-
work (LoWPAN) and multi-hop Wireless Sensor Network
(WSN) technology. This platform provides multi-hop long-
range connectivity between sensors and data sinks for real-
time sensor data dissemination and analytics. This solution
disseminates data in real-time, but it relies on the support
of known devices to implement a multi-hop operation.
Another strategy employed in data dissemination is data
replication. In [23], the authors proposed a mechanism to
deploy large scale observation systems in remote areas,
when there is not a permanent connection with the Internet.
The mechanism employs replication and distributed storage
techniques to increase the amount of data stored within
wireless sensor networks and to reduce the probability of
data loss. This strategy addresses the infrastructure issue,
but it does not meet the low latency requirements for
sensitive data dissemination.
Trust techniques contribute to ensure safety and security
in data dissemination, but there are challenges investigated
by several works from the literature [24]. Reputation [25]
and recommendation [10] models are techniques commonly
applied, as well as communities of interest (CoI) [11], to
evaluate the trust level of devices in networks. In general,
recommendation and reputation techniques lean on previ-
ous interactions of the devices, hence their behavior can be
characterized over time. Few works focus on zero-knowledge
environments, where maintaining interaction records is not
always feasible due to the dynamic of environments, devices
mobility and, sometimes, the constrained computational
resources for processing and storing information, like in IoT.
Dynamic interactions of devices over time are briefly useful.
In [10], the authors presented a protocol based on rec-
ommendation techniques and sharing information between
health devices in IoT for decision-making on access to
specific sites. The protocol evaluates environments in which
devices owners have been at a particular time and place, and
it builds a database for the future decision-making process.
The recommendation techniques incorporate characteristics
of social relationships from device owners to manage the
access to environments. However, they require many in-
teractions between devices, what is not always possible
in dynamic network environments. Therefore, those tech-
niques can inhibit the construction of database, making the
decision-making process unfeasible.
In [25], the authors presented the Reputation, Experience
and Knowledge (REK) approach, whose goal is to assess
trust based on multi-dimensional aspects: reputation, expe-
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rience and knowledge. Reputation consists in a public opin-
ion about who is evaluated. Experience takes into account
previous interactions with who is evaluated. Knowledge cor-
responds to the understandings about who is evaluated.
Although reputation allows choosing specific devices to
perform critical tasks, it demands knowledge of devices
interactions over time. Recommendations and experience
face the same issue. Also, measuring subjective indicators,
such as knowledge and experience, is a challenging [24].
In [11], the authors proposed a protocol to manage trust
in social IoT environments, where conditions are dynam-
ically changing (e.g., increasing misbehaving node pop-
ulation/activity, changeable behavior, rapid membership
changes, and interaction pattern changes). The protocol
establishes communities clustering devices based on rec-
ommendations and the relational trust attributes from the
social relationships of device owners, such as honesty and
cooperation. Network devices can participate in a cluster
or leave it any time. However, as recommendations rely
on past interactions, the protocol is unsuitable to dynamic
environments with eventual interactions.
Although all the above works offer important contribu-
tions, they do not make it possible to disseminate sensi-
tive data outside traditional care institutions. Existing solu-
tions employ techniques (e.g., reputation [25], recommen-
dation [10], experience, and knowledge [25]) that depend
on past interactions of the network devices. Hence, those
techniques inhibit to work under Zero-Knowledge condi-
tions [14]. Most importantly, data dissemination by broad-
casting data [21], multi-hopping transmission [22], and data
replication [23] faces issues like devices mobility and sparse
environments. These issues demand controlled data dissem-
ination, avoiding unauthorized access to data. STEALTH
overcomes these shortcomings.
3 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
Ensuring robustness in the dissemination of sensitive data
on IoT requires a level of trust among the existing de-
vices [26], that can be obtained from social aspects of their
owners (i.e., characteristics of people and social relation-
ships). The application domain defines the social aspects to
be employed (e.g., emotional, logical, and relational trust).
In dynamic environments, where there is no history of previ-
ous device interactions (i.e., Zero-Knowledge conditions [14]),
proposals for evaluating trust are still incipient.
A range of trust techniques has supported solutions
in different networks, like Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
(MANETs) [12]; Peer-to-Peer (P2P) [13], [27]; and, recently,
the Internet of Things (IoT). In IoT, one observes trust tech-
niques through centralized [10], [28], [29], and distributed
approaches [11], [25], [30], [31], [32], [33]. A set of tech-
niques stands out in the trust composition, such as message
exchange, communities of interest, and recommendation.
Among the attributes for trust evaluation, there is the
number of messages received and forwarded, interactions,
and activities. Communities group devices based on some
criteria (i.e., common characteristics or interests).
The trust assessment of network devices follows dif-
ferent approaches. The number of data writing and for-
wards within predicted limits may indicate a trustworthy
device. By exchanging specific messages, the authors have
demonstrated the correct functioning of a system or mecha-
nism [13]. Few evaluation techniques take as basis social re-
lationships among devices owners, observing information,
such as user profiles, location, or interests. Information from
social networks, like Facebook, Linkedin, and Foursquare,
for example, improves the evaluation of the relationships
between network devices; meanwhile, they restrict access to
information to only trusted ones [27].
Reputation techniques are commonly part of a trust as-
sessment process of IoT devices. This may happen through
centralized [10], [28], [29], or distributed approaches [11],
[25], [30], [31], [32], [33]. Although centralized approaches
for IoT are not commonly found in the literature, there are
any works available. These solutions usually assess trust
through reputation techniques and the number of messages
received and forwarded. These approaches do not meet all
IoT configurations, mainly in dynamic environments (i.e.,
where devices are highly mobile and eventually partici-
pate in the network). Distributed approaches suit better to
IoT, and, generally, the solutions associate reputation with
other trust techniques, like recommendation. This process
improves efficiency and effectiveness. Intrusion detection
systems employ reputation techniques [28]. They combine
reputation with watchdog strategies and trust to group
devices and handle their density and mobility. Therefore,
they can detect attacks in routing, and prevent, identify, and
isolate their effects on the network [28]. In such cases, they
calculate the reputation of a network device from the rela-
tion between the number of receiving and transmitting data.
They classify the device behavior based on that relation.
Devices propagate their reputation to others in the network,
allowing them to also calculate trust.
Recommendations are indirect observations and allow
devices to share information, for instance, about particular
environments (e.g., temperature, humidity, and time) [10].
This procedure helps in decision making, such as deciding
whether people can access some locations. Recommenda-
tions make feasible to compute the reputation of network
devices, taking into account direct observations that other
nodes make about it. Besides that, the choice of recommen-
dations to the detriment of older information contributes
to the increasing convergence speed of trust [31]. The re-
lationship between device owners at IoT enables grouping
devices to establish clusters or communities, given social
aspects such as honesty and cooperation [11], [30], [31].
Device interactions inside communities are more intense
than between distinct communities, where data traffic re-
duces to some extent. In this context, devices perform trust
assessment within the cluster they belong to. Besides, CoIs
allow coping with network scalability.
4 SYSTEM MODEL
This section provides an overview of the network model and
the STEALTH architecture. Next, we illustrate an example of
the operating STEALTH.
4.1 Network Model
STEALTH relies on social aspects and relationships from
the device owners to create local networks over time and
to maintain communities of interest, as depicted in Fig. 1.
Under a critical event leading to an emergency, STEALTH
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, VOL. [], NO. [], MONTH YEAR 4
disseminates sensitive data to appropriate receivers who are
physically close, taking as basis the receiver competence.
Hence, STEALTH supports emergency care to a person.
Fig. 1: Network model and sensitive data dissemination
STEALTH carries out on a set of portable devices
(nodes), denoted by D = {d1, d2, d3, ..., dj}, where dj ∈ D,
interconnected in a wireless communication network. These
nodes have processing and communication resources to
group nodes and disseminate data. Each node possesses a
unique identifier (Id) to identify it over time. Each device
leverages the competence (skill) and interests from its owner
or user, as attributes for trust calculation in STEALTH.
Hence, in a skill set S = {s1, s2, s3, ..., sk}, |S| 6= 0, a
competence level sm, such that sm ∈ S, is a value in the
range 0 to 1, represents a skill or knowledge from the owner
or user of a device dw, where dw ∈ D, in a particular field
of activity (e.g., doctor, police officer, other). Each node also
holds a set of interests In = {i1, i2, i3, ..., iz}, where |In| 6= 0
and In ⊂ I , and I is the set of all interests. An interest is a
hobby, taste or preference (e.g., music, health, other).
Nodes are grouped by common interests and form com-
munities over a given period of time. A community C
is a set of distinct tuples 〈node, period, interest〉, where
C = {〈d1, Pl, iz〉, 〈d2, Pl, iz〉, ..., 〈dn, Pl, iz〉} and Pl =
((ts0, te0), (ts1, te1), ..., (tsl, tel)), with ts∗ ≤ te∗.1 The effi-
ciency of applying node interests as a criterion for forming
communities is associated with their closeness, while com-
petence are effective inside each community. By simplicity,
we assume that disconnected or intermittent failing nodes
do not act on the network. Also, connected nodes behave in
an honest manner, disregarding attacks on system health.
4.2 Dissemination Control to Personal Sensitive Data
Fig. 2 illustrates the STEALTH (Social Trust-Based HEALTH
Information Dissemination Control system) architecture
that comprises two main modules: the Community Man-
agement module (CMM) and the Critical Event Manage-
ment module (CEM). The first module is responsible for cre-
ating and updating the communities of interest established
over time from the interaction among people. The second
module is responsible for verifying and disseminating the
sensitive data of a person in an emergency, The next subsec-
tions describe each module.
4.2.1 Community Management Module
This module measures the trust level of nearby devices
and includes them in a community. A device joins a com-
1. Definition adapted from the concept of dynamic communities
proposed by [34] and revised by [35]
Fig. 2: STEALTH Architecture
munity depending on its health interest and upon receiv-
ing the node identification message with its Id, interests,
and competence. CMM is also responsible for identify-
ing the node to a neighbor that is searching for neigh-
boring nodes to form their communities. It comprises
five components: Neighborhood, Interests, Competence, Trust
and Community Maintenance. The Neighborhood component
searches for neighboring nodes. It sends an identification
message to other nodes that are searching for neighbors
to identify its neighborhood. The Interests component an-
alyzes the interests of neighboring nodes when receiving
them, it identifies common interests to group nodes and
form communities of interest. The Competence component
deals with the competence of the neighboring nodes when
receiving it to know their health competence level. Based
on their interests, the Trust component measures the trust
level of neighboring nodes when receiving their interests
and competence. It verifies on their health community the
neighbor with the highest health competence level. Finally,
the Community Maintenance component coordinates the cre-
ation, extinction, and modification of CoIs, from nodes
interactions. It ensures the communities of interest following
the evolution of local networks established over time.
Network nodes start operating in an isolated way and, as
they move, find other nodes, and establish communities of
interest with those that are health-interested. As described in
Algorithm 1, each node periodically initializes its neighbor
list (l.3), announces its presence by broadcasting messages
(l.4) searching for neighboring nodes and wait for a time
interval to a new announcement (l.5). When a neighbor
node takes notice that a node announces its presence (l.8),
it forwards to this announcing node an identification message
(l.11). Upon receiving this message, the announcing node
verifies whether they are both health-interested (l.14). If they
are, the announcing node measures the trust level of the
neighboring node through EvaluateNeighborTrust (l.15) and
it includes the neighboring node into its neighbor list (l.16)
inside its health community. This takes into account the trust
level of the neighboring node, its competence (l.20) and the
common interests with the announcing node (l.21-23).
Competence Classification
Every device user possesses certain abilities to perform the
daily activities, which are competences obtained from pro-
fessions, skills, or hobbies, for example. STEALTH takes into
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Algorithm 1: Community Management
1 for each node d ∈ D do
2 procedure SEARCHNEIGHBORS
3 while (true) do
4 NL← 0
5 SendAnnounce( )
6 WaitInterval( )
7 end while
8 end procedure
9 procedure RECEIVEANNOUNCE( )
10 nskill← GetSkill( )
11 ninterest← GetInterests( )
12 AnswerAnnounce(id, nskill, ninterest)
13 end procedure
14 procedure RECEIVEANSWER (id, nskill, ninterests)
15 if (CommonInterests(ninterests) AND
16 HealthInterest(ninterests))
17 ntrust← EvaluateNeighborTrust(nskill, ninterests)
18 NL← RegNeighbor(id, nskill, ninterests, ntrust)
19 end if
20 end procedure
21 procedure EVALUATENEIGHBORTRUST (nskill, ninterests)
22 skilltrust← GetSkillT rust(skill, SkillsTaxonomy)
23 ncinterests← GetNCInterests(interests)
24 nninterests← GetNNInterests( )
25 itrust← ncinterests / nninterests
26 return (skilltrust + intereststrust) / 2
27 end procedure
account competences to disseminate sensitive data to the
right person (i.e., who is health-skilled). Therefore, a set of
health competences is hierarchically organized employing
the level of each profession knowledge as a criterion. This
organization gives rise to a skill taxonomy (ST ), depicted
in Fig. 3, which distributes health competences of each
profession in levels, as proposed by [36].
STEALTH follows an extension of this taxonomy with
other competences, according to the current need. It classi-
fies nodes based on the health knowledge of the device own-
ers. It organises devices related to people with healthcare
knowledge into two distinct areas - medicine and nursing.
In the branch of medicine, there are doctors. In the field of
nursing, there are nurses and several other professionals,
as well as a class of professionals with reduced health
skills, here called practitioners. This group encompasses
caregivers, police officers, firefighters, and other profession-
als trained to provide first aid.
Fig. 3: Healthcare skill taxonomy
STEALTH evaluates the similarity of people competence
employing a skill taxonomy based on [37], [38] and depicted
in Fig. 3. Fig. 4 illustrates the verification of the similarity of
a competence. In this work, the reference competence (sref )
is a doctor, because this professional has the highest health-
care knowledge. STEALTH calculates Sims through (1),
where N3 corresponds to the number of levels from the
Fig. 4: Measure of similarity between skills
common level (lcommon) closest to the neighbor competence
and the reference competence, to the root of the taxonomy
(Root). The N2 is the number of levels from the neighbor
competence (sNeigh) to the root of the taxonomy (Root),
and N1 is equal to the number of levels from the reference
competence (doctor) to the root of the taxonomy (Root). The
values of Sims vary in the range [0, 1], as showed in (2).
Sims =
2×N3
N1 +N2
(1)
Sims =
 0, if s ∈ {other}]0, 1[, if s /∈ {other, doctor}1, if s ∈ {doctor} (2)
Assuming the necessity to evaluate the similarity be-
tween life-saving (Sims) and doctor competences, we follow
the taxonomy in Fig. 3. The competence of a doctor is three
levels up to the root of the taxonomy and corresponds to
N1. The life-saving competence is four levels up to the root of
the taxonomy and equals to N2. Finally, STEALTH obtains
the distance of the common level from the assessed and
reference competences (health) to the root of the taxonomy,
N3 = 1. By means of (1), STEALTH obtains Sims = 0.4,
which is the similarity of the life-saving to doctor competence.
Trust Measurement
STEALTH measures trust level for the nodes based on social
aspects of their devices owners: an individual - Competence
- and a relational one - Similarity. Competence is a skill
perceived in a node, inherited from the device owner to
perform a task [24] (e.g., a profession, a hobby). Trust is
a variable value, and it increases as the healthcare compe-
tence of the assessed node resembles the doctor competence.
Similarity is related to common interests that the evaluating
node and the evaluated one possess. Therefore, trust value
increases as the number of common interests increases. A
node evaluates the trust of other nodes only if they are
health-interested. Hence, the measurement occurs whenever
the evaluated node possesses at least health interest, which
implies a minimum trust value always greater than 0.
One consider a node x encounters a node y and mea-
sures its trust level about the common interests between
them, T Ixy . It is a ratio between their common interests,
Ix∩Iy , and the interests of the evaluating node itself, Ix. T Ixy
is obtained through (3), which is based on [31]. The values
of T Ixy vary in the range [0, 1], as showed in (4). This trust
measurement occurs whether node y is health-interested.
T Ixy =
|Ix ∩ Iy |
|Ix|
(3)
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T Ixy =
 0, if Iy 6⊃ {health}]0, 1[, if Ix ∩ Iy 6= 0, Ix 6= Iy and {health} ⊂ Ix ∩ Iy1, if Ix = Iy and {health} ⊂ Ix ∩ Iy
(4)
Checking the similarity of node y competence with
that of a doctor enables computing trust about node y
competence, TSkillxy . STEALTH deems the competence of
a doctor as the highest in health and the calculation of
TSkillxy is done on a skills taxonomy (ST ) presented in Fig. 3,
based on [36], [38]. Therefore, TSkillxy equals the distance
(DST ) from node y competence (sy) relative to the health
competence within that taxonomy, and is obtained by (5).
In this work, we assume a distance function DST (S) that
receives as input a competence S from a evaluated node and
returns a value in the range of [0, 1]. This value indicates the
closeness of informed competence to doctor competence in
the taxonomy ST . The distance function DST is based on
the measure established by [37] and revised by [39]. The
possible values of TSkillxy vary in the range [0, 1], as in (6).
TSkillxy = Simy (5)
TSkillxy =
 0, if sy ∈ {other}]0, 1[, if sy /∈ {other, doctor}1, if sy ∈ {doctor} (6)
Finally, the trust level of node x over node y (Txy) is
0, whether they are not both health-interested. Otherwise,
Txy corresponds to the sum of trust related to their common
interests, T Ixy , with that derived from node y competence
(TSkillxy ), as in (7). When T
I
xy > 0, the values of Txy vary in
the range ]0, 1], depending on the values of T Ixy and T
Skill
xy ,
as showed in (4) and (6), respectively.
Txy =
T Ixy + T
Skill
xy
2
(7)
For example, considering a node x that assesses the trust
level of a node y, whose competence is caregiver, and both
hold a single interest, health. Employing the skills taxon-
omy (ST ) presented in Fig. 3 and the interest described,
Sims(caregiver) will hold a value of 0.28 (i.e., TSkillxy =
0.28). T Ixy holds value 1, as it’s calculated by (3), since nodes
are health-interested only. Hence, through (7), Txy = 0.64.
4.2.2 Critical Event Management Module
In this module, the Monitoring component verifies a person
health condition upon receiving her health status from her
sensing system. The medical device, carried by a person,
is responsible for identifying a critical event and report-
ing to STEALTH. The Sensitive Data component obtains
the person sensitive data in an emergency and ensures its
dissemination only under these conditions. The Availability
component verifies the appropriate device to disseminate
data, ensuring that it is the one with the highest health
competence. The Dissemination component coordinates the
sensitive data dissemination upon receiving them and the
identification of the appropriate person. This dissemination
occurs through alert messages sent only to people who
belong to the health community of the node and allowing
for its health competence.
Algorithm 2: Critical Event Management
1 for each node d ∈ D do
2 procedure HANDLEEMERGENCYEVENT( )
3 neighid← GetHigherScoreNeighbor( )
4 neighskill← GetNeighborSkill (neighid)
5 criticaldata← GetCriticalData (neighskill)
6 SendAlert(neighid, criticaldata)
7 SendStopAnnounce( )
8 end procedure
9 procedure RECEIVEALERT (id, criticaldata)
10 SendAckAlert( )
11 end procedure
12 procedure RECEIVESTOPANNOUCE (Id)
13 NL← RemoveNeighbor(Id)
14 end procedure
Nodes belonging to a health community support the
nodes that represent a person in an emergency, as described
in Algorithm 2. When a critical event occurs with a par-
ticular node (i.e., a person entered in an emergency), it
verifies the neighbor node with the highest trust level (l.2)
and obtains the appropriate sensitive data from the person
in an emergency (l.3-4). Next, it sends an alert message to
the selected node (l.5) with its sensitive data. Besides, it an-
nounces by broadcast the interruption of its operation (l.6).
Upon receiving an alert message, the node acknowledges
it (l.9). When a node notices that another node announces
that is interrupting the operation, it removes the announcer
node from its neighbor list (l.11). Therefore, this reaction
prevents a node in an emergency from being selected to
receive sensitive data from other nodes.
4.3 Operation
This section illustrates the operation of the STEALTH sys-
tem in an urban environment and demonstrates its con-
tribution to the controlled dissemination of sensitive data
in an emergency, hence the user can receive a first aid.
The illustrative scenario lies in a metropolitan area where
six people walk down the streets: a nurse, a patient, an
executive, a police officer, a fireman, and a doctor. Each one
has a profession or ability to perform specific tasks daily.
While the doctor is the most health-skilled, the police officer,
for instance, has some health knowledge to provide first aid.
The patient eventually needs emergency care.
All these people are health-interested and do not main-
tain relationships with each other. The nurse, the police
officer, the fireman, and the doctor are health-interested
because of their profession. The executive, for example,
is health-interested to help people in need. However, the
patient is health-interested to receive some aid. All those
people carry mobile devices (i.e., smartphones) to connect
to networks. STEALTH runs on these smartphones and it is
set to operate. The patient carries a medical device close or
on the body to analyze the blood pressure, for instance, and
report to an application installed on the smartphone. The
application reports the measured blood pressure values and
their normality for the patient.
People interactions change over time (t = {1, 2, ..., 8})
due to their mobility, as illustrated in Fig. 5 left. Their
devices establish ad hoc networks for data exchange. At
t6, the device of the patient and his smartphone interact
with other users, as represented by graph G6 (Fig. 5 right)
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Fig. 5: Interactions over time
TABLE 1: Trust Measurement
Trust Competence
doctor Nurse Police Officer
TSkill 1 0.33 0.28
TCoI 1 1 1
Trust 1 0.66 0.64
TABLE 2: Simulation settings
Parameters Values
# of Nodes 100
Nodes evaluated 37, 52, 69 and 70
Simulation time 900 sec
Emergency time 300 sec and 485 sec
Nodes speed 0.5 m/s to 2.0 m/s
Area 400 m x 430 m
Standard IEEE 802.11a
Package type UDP
Transmission radius 50 m
and each device forms its health community. The device of
the patient measures the trust level of neighboring nodes
and inserts them into its neighbor list with trust values
displayed in Table 1. On the assumption that the patient
enters an emergency at t6 (i.e., a critical event occurs at t6),
STEALTH running on the smartphone of the patient verifies
in his health community that the doctor is the person with
the highest trust, and disseminates the sensitive data to him.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents the performance evaluation for avail-
ability and reliability in the dissemination of people sensi-
tive data in an emergency. The next subsections describe the
simulation settings, scenarios and results.
5.1 Simulation settings
We employ simulations to evaluate STEALTH using the
NS-3 simulator, version 3.28. The environment has in-
cluded a Dell Inspiron with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4460S
CPU@2.90GHz 64 bits, 8GB RAM. A VM VirtualBox, version
5.2.18, r124319, supports a Debian operating system, version
9.1, to execute NS-3. Table 2 shows the main simulation
settings. We have conducted analysis in a scenario of 100
mobile devices (nodes), following a user mobility model
in an urban environment. These users carry a portable
equipment (i.e., smartphone). They had been deployed in
a 400 m x 430 m area. Users have walked in this area with
speeds ranging from 0.5 m/s to 2.0 m/s.
Users have followed the mobility model introduced in
[40], [41]. This is a realistic model implemented in Legion
Studio, a pedestrian simulator used for designing large
TABLE 3: Distribution of social aspects assigned to nodes
Competence # of Nodes Interest # of Nodes
Doctor 10 Health 20
Nurse 15 Music 30
Caregiver 20 Tourism 45
Other 25 Movies 60
Books 15
public spaces. The mobility is based on analytical models,
which allow mimic aspects of an individual movement in-
cluding personal preferences, surrounding awareness, and
perception of behaviors [42]. The mobility patterns follow
the least effort principle, where, just like in reality, each entity
tries to minimize the dissatisfaction before choosing its next
move. The employed scenario models the O¨stermalm area
of central Stockholm and consists of a grid of interconnected
streets, where each street is 2 m wide and lengths vary
between 20 m and 200 m. There are 12 passages that connect
the area to the outside world and one assumes that all
streets have equal node arrival rates. Upon arriving at an
intersection, nodes continue to move on the same street (if
possible) with probability of 50% or turn to other adjoining
streets with equal probability. The mobility trace file con-
tains a snapshot of the positions of all nodes every 0.6 sec.
The model considers a Poisson arrival process due to the
uniform and the truncated normal distributions resemble
reality to a higher extent [41].
Nodes have established ad hoc networks through trans-
mission applying the IEEE 802.11a standard and the UDP
transport protocol. A 50 m radius transmission allows nodes
creating communities to the extent that they move. Besides,
we configure nodes randomly with social aspects at each
simulation repetition. They keep a single competence and a
set of interests, with a minimum of one and a maximum
of five interests. Table 3 presents the distribution of the
assigned social aspects to the nodes. We have extended
NS-3 class node to incorporate social attributes to nodes.
The guidelines for running the application and its codes,
which include STEALTH, the modified NS-3 node class, and
mobility traces can be found at GitHub.2
We label nodes in simulation from 1 to 100. As defined
in each scenario, we have performed system behavior eval-
uation through four of them: 37, 52, 69, and 70. These nodes
keep the same configuration in all carried-out simulation
repetitions, while the other 97 nodes are randomly config-
ured in each simulation repetition. The total simulation time
is 900 s, and the selected nodes come into an emergency at
300 sec and 485 sec of a simulation repetition, according to
the evaluated scenario. We assume that all nodes exhibit
honest behavior, and there are security mechanisms for
validating their identities and protecting data transmission.
We also consider that people carry a device close to the body
responsible for the identification of a critical event and to
inform STEALTH. Results correspond to an average of 35
repetitions with a 95% confidence interval.
5.1.1 Evaluated scenarios
We employ three distinct evaluation scenarios in STEALTH
analysis, as detailed next.
2. https://github.com/agnaldosb/stealth
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SENACK: Single event, access to sensitive data, non
acknowledgement. Three nodes (i.e., 37, 52, and 70) always
behave in the same way at every repetition. They had been
selected because they move throughout the total simulation
time and travel the longest paths in the selected urban
environment. We assign to those nodes the same compe-
tence in all repetitions - other - and all possible interests -
health, tourism, music, movies, and books. The critical events
occur at the simulation time 300 sec, which represents the
moment a person enters in an emergency. At this time,
nodes have moved intensively and often interact to each
other. Therefore, there was always a neighborhood around.
SEACK: Single event, access to sensitive data, ac-
knowledgement. It is similar to SENACK, but the node
that receives sensitive data must acknowledge it. While
this confirmation is not received, nodes in an emergency
continue to look for neighboring nodes and keep their
health community up to date. Nodes stop searching for
new neighboring nodes and receiving new messages when
it receives the acknowledgement or when there is no other
neighboring node in its health community. Critical events
have occured at 300 sec of the simulation time.
MEACK: Multiple events, access to sensitive data, ac-
knowledgement. MEACK is similar to SEACK, except for the
nodes in an emergency disseminate their sensitive data and
a service priority indicator. This indicator makes it possible
decision-making process about the attending order that
must be followed by the appropriate entity when receiving
simultaneously sensitive data from multiples persons. Its
an integer value varying from 1 to 4, where 1 indicates
that a person needs the highest priority in health attending,
while 4 is the lowest one. Thus, when multiple nodes are
in an emergency and disseminate their sensitive data to a
single node, this node verifies the service priority indicators
received in order to acknowledges in the correct order. If
the received indicators holds distinct priorities, the acknowl-
edgement occurs in descending order of priority (i.e., from
the highest to the lowest). Otherwise, the acknowledgement
follow the sensitive data reception order. The nodes selected
to meet this are 52, 69, and 70. A fourth node, 63, is
responsible for receiving data from those nodes. We have
chosen these nodes because they were close enough at the
instant 485 sec of the simulation to exchange data. We have
assigned to nodes 52, 69, and 70 the same competence in all
repetitions - other - and all possible interests - health, tourism,
music, movies, and books. Node 63 has also received all the
same interests, but a different competence - doctor. Hence,
it has achieved the highest trust level within the health
communities of the neighboring nodes, increasing its chance
of being selected to receive sensitive data.
5.1.2 Metrics
We employ specific evaluation metrics aiming to verify
the network behavior and its performance. Therefore, we
discuss the results about the urban pedestrian mobility be-
havior through the metric Average Number of Neighbors (NN ).
The evaluation of data availability provided by STEALTH
takes into account the evolution of health communities
over time and the Average Number of Health Communities
(NC ). The assessment of data reliability in the dissemination
service follows the metrics: Hit Rate (HR), Fault Rate (FR),
Average Time to Access Sensitive Data (AT ), and Hit Rate by
Competence (HRSkill). Next, all these metrics are described.
Average Number of Neighbors (NN ): computes the num-
ber of nodes belonging to the local area network of a specific
node over time, which represents its neighborhood. NR
corresponds to the average of the sum of all node neigh-
bors at each time interval, j = ts, when we compute this
neighborhood, and the total number of time intervals, ts,
throughout all repetitions (NR). We obtain NN through (8).
NN =
NR∑
i = 1
ts∑
j = 1
Nij
ts × NR
(8)
Average Number of Health Communities (NC ) accounts
the average number of communities established by a node
across time. NC corresponds to the average of the sum of
all health communities formed by a node throughout all
repetitions (NR), as presented in (9).
NC =
NR∑
i = 1
ts∑
j = 1
Cij
ts × NR
(9)
Hit Rate (HR) indicates the rate of success for delivering
data to the appropriate person. HR corresponds to the
ratio of the total hits to sensitive data (ASucess) to the total
number of times sensitive data available to be accessed
(ADisp), and it’s obtained through (10).
HR =
ASuccess
ADisp
× 100 (10)
Fault Rate (FR) accounts data disseminated and not ac-
cessed by other nodes. It’s the percentage of data protected
in an emergency and calculated by (11).
FR = 100−HR (11)
Hit Rate by Competence (HRSkill) is equivalent to HR,
but it evaluates hit rate for each competence individually, ac-
cording to competences seen in Table 3. HRSkill is the ratio
between the hit rate of a single competence, ASkill, and total
hits to sensitive data (ASucess). It’s obtained through (12).
HRSkill =
ASkill
ASuccess
× 100 (12)
Average Time to Access Sensitive Data (AT ) computes
the time to access sensitive data in an emergency. AT
corresponds to the sum of the ratio from the time difference
of (tr) and the time of their dissemination (td), and the total
of repetitions (NR). It’s calculated by (13).
AT =
NR∑
i = 1
tr(i) − td(i)
NR
(13)
5.2 Results and Analysis
This subsection presents the results obtained during the sim-
ulations performed for each evaluated scenario. We analyze
them in terms of STEALTH dependability (availability and
reliability) and safety (availability). The STEALTH transient
state ended at 25 sec of each repetition. This was the moment
that the system has reached its steady-state performance
(i.e., when all nodes were able to send and receive mes-
sages). Hence, the transient removal has encompassed the
deletion of results obtained until 25s of each repetition.
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Fig. 6: Dynamics and size of local networks over time
5.2.1 Assessing the effect of node mobility
The applied mobility model comprises pedestrians, and
each node always takes the same path in all simulation
repetitions [43]. The average number of neighboring nodes
(NN ) characterizes the model by the nodes previously se-
lected in each scenario and Fig. 6 presents their neighbor-
hood behavior. We verify the neighborhood evolution along
each repetition until a determined chosen time until the
moment nodes enter in an emergency. Fig. 6 top compares
the behaviors of the neighborhoods of nodes 37, 52 and 70.
While nodes 37 and 52 keep a similar NN in the SENACK
and SEACK scenarios, node 70 neighborhood stands out for
the number of nodes. MEACK scenario brings out different
results, as demonstrates Fig. 6 top right, where Node 69
presents a very small neighborhood (NN = 0).
The average number of neighbors (NN ) shows the mo-
bility model and indicates the presence of a node neighbor-
hood. But, it does not demonstrate neighborhood evolution
across time. Fig. 6 down show the evolution of the neighbor-
hood for nodes 37, 52, 69 and 70 in the evaluated scenario
and in a given simulation repetition. The presence of the
node 70 neighborhood in SENACK scenario, for example,
indicates that STEALTH has created local networks around
that node for 100% of the time it was active in the simulation
repetition (Fig. 6 down left). The opposite has happened
with node 69 in scenario MEACK (Fig. 6 down right). This
node starts creating local networks around it at 393 sec from
the beginning of the simulation until 485 sec (i.e., during
14.6% of its running simulation time), when it entered in
an emergency. In both cases, this behavior results from the
employed mobility model.
The moment chosen to an emergency to happen
influences the node neighborhood size. For instance,
Fig. 6 down left shows the node 70 neighborhood composed
of 22 nodes at 300 sec of the SENACK scenario. Hence, node
70 could disseminate its sensitive data to several neighbors
during an emergency. The MEACK scenario presents a
distinct behavior. Fig. 6 down right shows the neighborhood
evolution around nodes 52, 69 and 70. Node 69 established
local networks only at time 393s from the simulation, over
14.6% of its uptime until it stops the operation at time
485 sec. Hence, it has maintained a tiny neighborhood
(NN = 0), and at that time, it had only 2 neighbors. In the
majority of the simulation time, its mobility takes it away
from the other nodes.
5.2.2 Availability
We evaluate STEALTH availability (i.e., how successful
STEALTH is in efficiently disseminating people sensitive
data in an emergency.) Fig. 7 top presents system behavior
by synthesizing the average number of health communities
(NC ) created over time in each scenario. Although SENACK
and SEACK behave similarly, we observe a distinct be-
havior in each evaluated scenario. Node 37, for instance,
establishes NC = 4 in all simulations in SENACK. The
best performance in all scenarios was achieved by node
70, but in MEACK it stands out for establishing almost 20
communities on average in each simulation. This behavior
improves the system availability for the dissemination of
sensitive data in emergencies. NC characterizes the dynam-
ics of established local networks, mainly their topology.
As expected, nodes mobility through distinct paths and
their social aspects - interests - significantly impacts on
the creation of health communities. The dynamics of the
evaluated health communities and their size over time in a
specific simulation repetition is depicted in Fig. 7 down. The
mobility model made it possible interactions between nodes
until the moment they entered in an emergency. Results
show that STEALTH follows the dynamics of the established
local networks, mainly owing to nodes mobility. STEALTH
has verified changes in the node neighborhood and keep
its health communities up to date. In the SENACK and
SEACK scenarios, nodes 37, 52, and 70 have maintained
health communities for 100% of the time they were active.
Over this time, STEALTH was always ready to disseminate
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Fig. 7: Availability of health communities over time
node sensitive data, because there were other nodes assist-
ing them. In the MEACK scenario, one observes a distinct
behavior, as shown in Fig. 7 right. Node 52 keeps health
communities over 93.39% of the time it was active. Upon
entering an emergency, it has created a community with
a couple of its neighbors, and successfully disseminated
its sensitive data. Node 69 maintains a distinct behavior
and keeps communities only over 11.30% of the time until
it enters an emergency, Finally, we observe that node 70
has maintained health communities the longest, 98.26%. In
all scenarios, STEALTH has identified node neighborhoods
across the time. It successfully creates health communities
and keeps them available to support a sensitive data dis-
semination in an emergency.
The size of communities is smaller than or equal to
the size of the neighborhood at the same instant of time.
Health communities contemplate nodes around who are
health-interested. Node 69 had been in a critical condition in
MEACK scenario. It has created its first health community
only at the time 393s, (Fig. 7 – right). Until that moment,
node 69 could not disseminate its sensitive data.
5.2.3 Reliability
We analyze the STEALTH reliability in disseminating sensi-
tive data from people in an emergency, We have conducted
this analysis by evaluating the behavior of nodes 37, 52, 69,
and 70 in each evaluated scenario. In the SENACK scenario,
Table 4 shows that node 70 successfully disseminates (HR)
its sensitive data in 100% of the emergencies throughout all
repetitions. Nodes 37 and 52 have achieved a slighter differ-
ence in results than node 70, when they have disseminated
their sensitive data in 97.14% and 94.29% of emergencies,
respectively. In the SEACK scenario, node 70 was successful
in 85.71% of emergencies. Although all nodes in the MEACK
scenario were 100% successful in disseminating their data,
this result was expected given the chosen emergency time.
Grouping nodes in CoIs impacts on hit rate (HR), because
clusters ensure the dissemination of sensitive data to specific
nodes inside the community. We observe the importance
TABLE 4: Data dissemination
Scenario SENACK SEACK MEACK
Metric HR (%) FR (%) HR(%) FR (%) HR (%) FR (%)
Node
37 97.14 2.86 74.29 25.71 - -
52 94.29 5.71 77.14 22.86 100 0
69 - - - - 100 0
70 100 0 85.71 14.29 100 0
TABLE 5: Latency in access to disseminated data
Average Time to Access Sensitive Data (ms)
Scenario SENACK SEACK MEACK
Node
37 < 1 < 1 -
52 2.5 3 4
69 - - < 1
70 17 170 27
of CoI in controlling data dissemination through the fault
rate (FR) metric. In the SEACK scenario, the sensitive data
from node 37 was successfully accessed by other nodes in
25.71% of emergencies. This behavior is due to the lack of a
health community at these moments, or the disruption of its
connection to other nodes due to their mobility.
The cost to access the sensitive data, disseminated over
time, is represented by the average time to access it (AT ),
which is influenced by the dynamics of the established local
area networks. Table 5 shows that the results mostly meet
the IEEE maximum latency for medical alert delivery - 125
ms [8]. In the SENACK and SEACK scenarios, nodes have
promptly accessed sensitive data from node 37 (AT < 1 ms).
However, node 70 achieves a higher cost in SEACK scenario,
when the access to its sensitive data happens after 170 ms of
its dissemination. In all other situations, STEALTH obtains
a cost lower than 27 ms. CoIs contribute to the decision
making in verifying the appropriate node to receive the data
and to a lower cost to access the disseminated sensitive data.
Social aspects (i.e., interests and competences) in associa-
tion with CoIs allow to assess the trust level of nodes and
enable controlling their sensitive data dissemination. This
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TABLE 6: Dissemination control
Scenario SENACK SEACK MEACK
Node 37 52 70 37 52 70 52 69 70
HRSkill
Doctor 44.12 81.82 91.43 7.69 50 18.18 100 100 100
Nurse 32.35 18.18 8.57 7.69 30 13.63 0 0 0
Caregiver 23.53 0 0 7.69 16.67 36.36 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 76.92 3.33 31.81 0 0 0
dissemination occurs only to nodes belonging to a health
community and in light of the node competence (Table 3).
This process succeeds under a zero-knowledge condition (i.e.,
regardless node previous interactions). The relevance of
the node competence is evaluated by the metric successful
access to data by competence (HRSkill), as shown in Table 6.
In the SEACK scenario, 76.92% of the total sensitive data
dissemination went to nodes with other competences. In
50% of sensitive data dissemination from node 52, there
was a node with doctor competence to access its data. This
behavior indicates that in 50% of emergencies, STEALTH
found out the presence of at least one doctor in the available
health community. The success observed in the MEACK
scenario (100% of data disseminated to nodes with doctor
competence) is expected since both competences and emer-
gency time contribute to this.
The network topology of the SENACK scenario in one
specific simulation is depicted in Fig. 8. We observe the
neighborhood of the evaluated nodes and their health com-
munity. There was only one neighbor inside node 37 health
community (i.e., node 50) who held the nurse competence
(Fig. 8 left). As nodes 3, 35, and 56 were not health-
interested, node 37 has disseminated its sensitive data to
node 50. The node 52 neighborhood was more significant
and impacted in its health community size. This condition
has increased the likelihood of node 52 health commu-
nity having members with different skills, as shown in
Fig. 8 middle. There are two nodes with doctor competence
(i.e., nodes 60 and 62), the first one was the appropriate to
access sensitive data from node 52. Although both possess
the same competence, their interests were distinct. The
number of interests in common between nodes 60 and 52
is greater than between 60 and 62. Hence, node 60 achieves
a higher trust level and it is selected. Something similar
happens to node 70, which its neighborhood is the biggest
(Fig. 8 right). However, its health community comprises
only two neighboring nodes (i.e., nodes 13 and 89), and they
both possess the other competence. Hence, the selection of
the node to disseminate the sensitive data occurs based on
the number of common interests they had each other. In this
case, node 13 is selected. Sensitive data is disseminated in
a controlled manner, with no exposure of the data to unau-
thorized people. The decision-making process for choosing
nodes to disseminate data is similar in the other scenarios.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This article presented STEALTH, a system for disseminating
sensitive health data in a controlled manner in dynamic
wireless local area networks. It builds virtual clusters taking
into account communities of interest and it employs social
trust to enable the devices to decide on data dissemination
under an emergency. Simulation results from realistic sce-
nario have shown STEALTH ability to ensure the dissemina-
tion of sensitive data. STEALTH has achieved a reliability of
up to 97.14% in the access to disseminated data, a maximum
latency of 170 ms, and up to 100% of availability. As future
work, the reliability in decision-making will be contrasted
under security threats and simultaneous severe events to
complement the safety vision presented in this work.
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